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AbstrAct
The paper argues that local government autonomy in Nigeria is attainable on the 
platforms of democratic imperative (local self-governance); legal/administrative 
competence; financial innovativeness and responsibility. This paper interrogates 
and affirms the nexus between decentralisation and local government, zeroing - in 
on devolution as the taxonomy for guaranteeing autonomy, and ultimately leading to 
grassroots development. As a qualitative study with reliance on secondary sources 
of data, the utilisation of Development Theory (in Local Government Studies) as the 
framework for textual analysis of issues/themes illuminated the discussion, conclu-
sion and recommendations. Findings reveal that constitutional ambivalence, defec-
tive federal practice, intergovernmental relations and institutional weaknesses have 
in several ways stymied local government autonomy and inhibited the developmen-
tal roles of local governments in Nigeria. The suggestions proffered are capable of 
addressing the gaps and problems identified.
Keywords: Autonomy; Decentralisation; Grassroots; Development; Local Govern-
ment; Nigeria.
1. Introduction
There is an avalanche of literature and prodigious debates on the intertwining 
issues/concepts of decentralisation, local government autonomy and grassroots 
development. The denominator and underlying argument zero - in on the attainment 
of effective service delivery in the localities. For instance, while some writers con-
ceive decentralisation as a type of power relation that describes local government 
(Duru; 2001b; Odoh; 2004), a group of scholars agree that local government is a 
product or derivative of decentralisation (Adamolekun; 2002; Ezeani; 2004). How-
ever, these assertions must be qualified and utmost caution taken, in order not to 
mislead and create unnecessary ambiguities.
The notion of decentralisation as a type of power relation and power sharing 
among sub-national units introduces the dimension of intergovernmental relations 
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to the discussion on local government autonomy in Nigeria which is controversial 
and has created liabilities for federal practice in the country. To be sure, the identi-
fication of local government as a product of decentralisation must be discussed as 
devolution (or democratic decentralisation) in order to be understood with reference 
to local government autonomy. It becomes clear therefore that devolution is a form 
of decentralised administration. The taxonomy includes: deconcentration (adminis-
trative or bureaucratic decentralisation in which autonomy is an exception, rather 
than the rule of operations); and delegation. Adamolekun (2002, 50), added fiscal 
decentralisation which amounts to “transfer of responsibility for budget and finan-
cial decisions, from higher to lower levels of government.” This refers to 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations which has been a thorny issue in the discussion 
on federalism in Nigeria, and partly explains the dismal performance of local gov-
ernment councils in Nigeria as some studies have shown (Onah; 2004b; Onah and 
Ibietan; 2010).
It is particularly striking and noteworthy that the oscillation of paradigms in 
Public Administration which introduced the New Public Management as a move-
ment away from the disciplinary orthodoxy has added divestment as a typology of 
decentralisation. Adeyeye (2013) posits that divestment is the transfer of planning 
and administrative responsibilities or other public functions from government to 
voluntary, private or non-governmental institutions with clear benefits to and 
involvement of the public. Contracting-out, partial service provision, deregulation or 
full privatisation are cited as illustrations of divestment. This slant of Managerialism 
into Public Administration scholarship has been traced to predatory global capitalism 
with heavy attributes of sweeping privatisation, de-legitimization of public adminis-
tration, shrinking the “public sphere,” and degrading the state and public administra-
tion (Farazmand; 2012, 494). It is however doubtful if public sector reforms in 
Nigeria underscored by Managerialism at central and sub-national units have yielded 
much results, especially in this Fourth Republic. 
Additionally, the narrative in the Fourth Republic have taken the form of queries 
and questions on the capacity of local government councils (LGCs) in providing 
services, let alone initiate actions that can facilitate grassroots development. Funding 
inadequacies; executive and administrative incapacity; political interferences from 
higher level governments have been advanced as weakening the capability and via-
bility of LGCs as potential agents of rural development (Odoh; 2004). These factors 
conjoin to circumscribe the much touted autonomy of local governments in Nigeria.
In a related discourse, Adamolekun (2009, 19) submits that “since the return to 
civilian rule in 1999, news reports on LGs … perceived [them] as failed institutions 
[and] in virtually all of Nigeria, the Local Government system is largely seen as a 
conduit for the mindless plunder of resources otherwise available … for worthwhile 
development of the grassroots.” It is obvious in the above assertion that the LGCs 
have not been able to justify their existence by providing socio-economic services 
and democratic dividends to the local populace. Mimiko (2010, 12) stretches the 
argument further and corroborates that “… most Nigerians find succour and fulfil-
ment in their ethnic groups …, and increasingly on their own individual initiatives, 
underscoring the emergence of micro-municipality governance system in the coun-
try…” Mimiko (2010) expatiates thus:
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The concept of micro-municipality governance describes a situation in 
which all social services paid for and/or entitled to by the citizenry are either 
not delivered at all or delivered in a perfunctory manner by the state, thus 
compelling the individual to set up virtually all apparatuses of governance 
for their own private usage-infrastructure, security, rules of engagement (as 
the law and order regime is hardly effective) …
The above averment confirms the palpable state of infrastructure and service 
delivery in Nigeria, and responsibility for the deficit must be shared by all tiers of 
government. However, studies have shown that the LGCs as the closest tier of 
government to the grassroots is best positioned to deliver these services, and the 
extent to which they perform underscore their efficiency (Ibietan and Ndukwe; 
2014a), but Odoh (2004) illuminates our understanding on the default in this area, 
based on the lack of autonomy and sundry issues. As a corollary, Adeyemo in 
Ikeanyibe (2016) advances the explanation of conflicting constitutional provisions 
as an impediment to effective service delivery at the third tier and as an obstacle 
to grassroots development.
Predicated on the preceding and a litany of other failings/foibles of the LGCs, 
scholars have argued that “it is absurd and wasteful to retain the current uniform 
local government” (Soludo; 2012, 4). In a recent study, Ikeanyibe (2016, 13) con-
curs and submits “that Nigeria and similar emerging federations…should discard 
the idea of a third-tier local government system.” These averments notwithstanding, 
there were conscious efforts on the part of successive central governments to make 
LGCs in the country live up to their billings. These found expression in reforms, 
and as documented by Duru (2001a), local government reforms constitute part of 
decentralisation. On this note, the 1976 LG reforms is a watershed in the annals of 
decentralisation efforts in Nigeria. Ibietan (2008, 26) affirms that the reform 
“leaves no one in doubt as to the … role of local government in governance and as 
a veritable agent of development and grassroots participation in the democratic 
process.” Subsequent developments and practices stymied this, and the expected 
gains were eroded.
2. Method, Main Argument and Structure of the Paper
This is a qualitative study, and it adopts the longitudinal research approach. Through 
a reliance on secondary sources of data collection, the trajectory of federal practice 
in Nigeria, with a bearing on the observable trends in local government autonomy 
and implications for grassroots development in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, were 
highlighted. The utilisation of development theory (in local government studies) as 
framework for textual analysis of issues illuminated the discussion, conclusion and 
recommendations of the paper.
The thrust of this paper, is that LGCs must be economically competitive and inno-
vative to strengthen their internally generated revenue levels. They must also be fis-
cally responsible and responsive. The combination of these will invigorate them as 
robust institutions capable of attracting and retaining techno-bureaucratic and compe-
tent manpower that can formulate and implement people-oriented policies and pro-
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grammes culminating in grassroots development. It is an oxymoron to assert or uphold 
local government autonomy by relying on federal financial handouts, experiencing 
poor fiscal health, combustible intergovernmental relations, and unnecessary interfer-
ences from higher - level governments. Power is not given; it must be taken by being 
financially independent and responsible, technically competent, and leveraging on 
democracy to provide good governance to the local populace and in public affairs.
The paper is segmented thus: Abstract; Introduction; Method, Main Argument, 
and Structure of the paper; Conceptual Discourse on Decentralisation, Local 
Government, Autonomy, Grassroots/Rural Development; Theoretical Framework; 
Local Government Autonomy and Implications for Grassroots Development in 
Nigeria; Conclusion and Recommendations.
3. Conceptual Discourse
The concepts of Decentralisation; Local Government; Autonomy and Grassroots/
Rural Development are discussed in this section. 
3.1 The Concept of Decentralisation
Extant literature in Public Administration provides an array of discussion on the 
concept of decentralisation. Many writers demonstrate how decentralisation under-
pins effective management of organisations and sub-national units for qualitative 
service delivery and the attainment of goals and objectives. Ordinarily, decentralisa-
tion presupposes the existence of a centralised body or authority that requires 
decongestion through the transfer of decision - making power or abilities to subor-
dinates for effective operations.
In the context of this discourse however, the concept has a wide range of uses 
within the purview of Public Administration. A first usage refers to “an administra-
tive measure involving the transfer of management responsibilities and resources to 
agents of the central government located outside the headquarters at one or more 
levels (province, region, division and district)” (Adamolekun; 2002, 49). This form 
of administrative or bureaucratic decentralisation is commonly known as deconcen-
tration and it typifies local administration, in which the essential attributes of local 
government such as autonomy, democracy and independent finance are lacking. 
There are also field offices of the central government emanating from the process of 
deconcentration, and this is known as field administration.
Another type of decentralisation entails the transfer of specific powers, functions 
and resources by the central government to sub-national units. When these sub-
national levels of government are substantially independent of the central govern-
ment, possess legal personality and operate at the grassroots, such arrangement is 
referred to as devolution or democratic decentralisation, which is synonymous with 
an ideal local government backed by autonomy. In some federal and unitary systems, 
the structure, functions and powers of the devolved tier are enshrined and clearly 
stipulated in the constitution (which is the supreme law governing the country). This, 
therefore underlines and dictates the nature of intergovernmental legislative, social 
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services, administrative and fiscal relations (for details, see Ibietan; 2011, 59-66). It 
is therefore not surprising that Adamolekun (2002, 50) discussed fiscal decentralisa-
tion as intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Decentralisation is also used to refer to delegation of authority, and Ezeani 
(2004) posits that it is more extensive in usage than deconcentration. Delegation is 
conceptualised thus:
… the transfer of decision-making and management authority for specific 
functions to semi-independent agencies such as public enterprises, regional 
planning and area development authorities, multi-purpose and single-pur-
pose functional authorities, and special project implementation units (Luke 
in Ezeani; 2004, 5).
The organisations and agencies invested with delegated authority may enjoy varied 
or measured degrees of autonomy and resources to enable them execute develop-
ment schemes. Typical illustrations of this in Nigeria include: the Directorate of 
Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI); River Basin Development Authori-
ties; National Agricultural Land Development Authorities; the Nigerian Agricul-
tural and Rural Development Bank; the Operation Feed the Nation; and the  Expand-
ed Programme on Immunization (EPI) to mention but a few.
Olowu (2002) discussed decentralisation within the ambit of reforms and with 
reference to African countries. The first typology (out of the four identified) is 
regionalisation or federalisation. A notable trait of this is that “each region is recog-
nised and protected by the national constitution to define and deliver a number of 
specified services in a way that reflects the tastes and peculiar needs of that region’s 
population within a federal framework” (Olowu; 2002, 129). The author also cap-
tured this as “nonconcentration” and alluded to Nigeria’s dismal performance on this. 
Corroborating, Onyeoziri (2002) identified regionalism as an alternative policy 
option for managing the nationality question in Nigeria, but it failed due to the con-
tradictions embedded in it (for details, see Ibietan and Itodo; 2015, 3-4 ).
Another form of decentralisation, according to Olowu (2002) emphasises the 
creation and strengthening of democratically elected local governments with sub-
stantial discretionary powers to elected persons from the locality in unitary or fed-
eral states. This taxonomy converges with the idea of devolution as posited by 
Adamolekun (2002) and Ezeani (2004). The third and fourth type of decentralisation 
identified by Olowu (2002) crystallised around deconcentration/field administration; 
and divestment to voluntary organisations as discussed by Ezeani (2004) and 
Adeyeye (2013) respectively. It is noteworthy that inadequate human capacity in the 
localities to undertake people-oriented services, and the preponderance of zero-sum 
game in intergovernmental relations in many African countries, especially Nigeria 
constitute impediments to the full realisation of decentralisation initiatives.
Building on the works of other scholars, Abe and Omotoso (2014) posit that 
decentralisation presents a shift from top-bottom approach to governance towards a 
bottom-top orientation. According to them, it entails the transfer of power and 
responsibilities from the central government to sub-national units or agencies. The 
authors however identified Privatisation/Partnership as the fourth type of decentrali-
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sation, and their discourse on this tallies with that of Adeyeye (2013). The other 
(three) forms of decentralisation discussed by Abe and Omotoso (2014, 187-188) 
bears convergence with Adamolekun (2002).
3.2 The Concept of Local Government
Local government as a concept lends itself to many interpretations, and as noted by 
Ibietan (2010), it is encapsulated in a definitional web like other themes or concepts 
in the social sciences, because there exist divergent views on the subject as authors, 
scholars, writers and practitioners abound. Some of the views or notions can be 
wrong and misleading. For instance, Effiom (2001. 86) treated local government and 
local administration thus: “local administration would be used interchangeably with 
local government.” This is quite erroneous and it is bound to confuse a neophyte in 
Public Administration or Local Government studies.
Marshall in Nwachuku (2000, 1) conceives local government based on three 
characteristics, namely: “operation in a restricted geographical area within a nation 
or state; a locally elected or selected membership or a local council; and a measure 
of autonomy.” As appealing as this definition would have been, because of the iden-
tification of the principle of autonomy which is germane to this paper, it missed the 
point, having ignored the attributes of legal personality, political participation, effi-
cient service delivery and resource mobilisation which are central to the existence of 
a devolved local government system.
Duru (2001a) avers that local government “refers to a political authority set up 
by a nation or state as a subordinate authority for the purpose of dispersing or decen-
tralising political power.” This definition is similar to that of Awa in Nwachuku 
(2000), except that the latter identified the purpose as rendering delegated services. 
This conceptualisation typifies deconcentration, delegation or field administration, 
while the former assertion (Duru; 2001b) merely underscores the democratic crite-
rion and imperative of local government.
Ezeani (2004, 24) posits that the local government refers to the “transfer of sub-
stantial decision-making powers and responsibilities to legally dependent units out-
side the control of the central government.” This characterisation reinforces the ideal 
local government and approximates the Whearean Concept of federal practice as 
relationship between equals and coordinates. Stretching this point further, Ezeani 
(2006:253) submits that “local government is generally seen as a veritable agent of 
development and grassroots participation in the democratic process.” This view 
underlines part of the focus of this paper, but misses the angle of autonomy which is 
required to facilitate development and enhance democratisation at the grassroots.
Building on the works of other scholars (Duru; 2001a; Ezeani; 2006), Ibietan 
(2008, 26-27) infers as follows:
…local government must be representative, autonomous to a reasonable 
degree; must be functional. It must also be technically and economically 
viable. It has to be representative in the sense that the policies made by it 
must reflect the wishes of the people; and to mobilize the local populace for 
self-development…
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The above averment is tangential to the central themes of this paper. It underscores 
autonomy, grassroots development, democratic local self-governance, technical and 
economic viability as bases for autonomy, mobilisation for rural development, and 
more importantly, there is an emphasis on locality principle. The author expatiates 
that economic viability implies the ability of local governments to generate financial 
resources required for operations and developmental purposes. However, most local 
government councils in Nigeria have not performed well in this regard due to poor 
internally generated revenue efforts which arises from the dominance of poverty in 
rural areas, tax evasion, corruption, fraud and over-dependence on federal alloca-
tion. Technical viability refers to the competence, skills and expertise of personnel.
There is unanimity of opinion among scholars (Wapmuk, 2005; Ezeani, 2012; 
Wilson and Ibietan; 2013) on the clarity and comprehensiveness of the idea of local 
government as documented in the celebrated 1976 Reform Guidelines as follows:
Government at the local level exercised through representative councils 
established by law to exercise specific powers within defined areas. These 
powers should give the councils substantial control over local affairs as well 
as the staff and institutional and financial powers to initiate and direct the 
provision of services and to determine and implement projects so as to 
complement the activities of the state and federal governments in their areas 
and ensure, through active participation of the people and their traditional 
institutions that local initiatives and response to local needs are maximised 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria; 1976, 1).
More importantly, Ezeani (2012, 11-13) identified these salient features which are 
inherent in the above conceptualisation: localness, legal existence as enshrined in 
the constitution; enjoys substantial autonomy; exists within a defined territory; 
exercises authority over a given population; performs functions based on the consti-
tution; the Council is composed of elected representatives of the local people; local 
government comprises departments, divisions and units which facilitate the accom-
plishment of its goals, objectives and functions. It is observable that except for a 
brief period (before the Second Republic, and between December 1987 and 1990) 
(Tonwe and Allen, 2009:359), the bulk of above features existed more in constitu-
tional breach and largely explains the lack of autonomy in the Nigerian local govern-
ment system.
Sharma et al. (2012, 995) posit that a devolved local government system “pre-
supposes the existence of a local authority with power to act independently of exter-
nal control as well as the participation of the local community in the administration 
of its own affairs.” They contend further that “local self-government is the govern-
ment of a specified locality by the local people through the representatives elected 
by them”. These averments do not approximate the practice in Nigeria, especially in 
the Fourth Republic as typified by the nature of intergovernmental relations (see 
Onah; 2004a, 1-16; Onah, 2004b, 189-168; Abe and Omotoso; 2014, 194-196). The 
characteristics of local government according to Sharma et al. (2012, 996-1002) are: 
local area; statutory status; autonomous; local participation; local finances and 
accountability; civic services for the local people and general purpose authority. 
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Local government is vitally important for the following reasons: it is a platform for 
grassroots democracy; serves as training school for politics; encourages the partici-
pation of the local populace in public affairs; competence in solving local problems; 
it is arguably economical; reduces the burden on the central government; serves as a 
channel of communication; vital for national progress.
Corroborating the preceding and our discussion on this theme, Asaju (2010) in 
Ikeanyibe (2016, 2) expressed the features of an ideal (devolved) local government 
system this way:
1. Local government should become a legal entity distinct from the state and 
federal government;
2. Local government should be administered by democratically elected offi-
cials;
3. Local government should have specific powers to perform a range of func-
tions assigned it by law;
4. Local government should enjoy substantial autonomy to perform an array of 
functions, plan, formulate and execute its own policies, programmes and 
projects, and its own rules and regulations as deemed for its local needs. 
This autonomy includes power to control its finance…recruit and discipline 
its staff.
The above features bear true convergence and reinforce the views of Ibietan (2008) 
on this note. Additionally, these statements underscore the Whearean essence of true 
federal arrangement and practice. However, Ikeanyibe (2016) submits that this 
 cherished model has not materialised in practice in the Nigerian federation.
3.3 The Concept of Local Government Autonomy
There is no meaningful discourse, debate or commentary on local government in 
Nigeria that is concluded without reference to the subject of autonomy. Yet, only few 
scholars or writers have attempted to conceptualise the term, it is described more by 
its default or lack of manifestation, and this draws analogy to the proverbial elephant 
which is recognised by its sheer size.
Nwachuku (2000, 11) posits that “autonomy … refers to the degree of freedom, 
authority and power or command which a local authority can exercise in the manage-
ment of its own affairs WITHOUT reference to the state or federal government.” 
This view conceives autonomy in terms of wide latitudes and discretion in the man-
agement of resources and the locality without interferences and partnership from 
higher - level governments, and as variously documented in literature, this has been 
largely a mirage in intergovernmental relations in Nigeria. The author submits fur-
ther that autonomy is a function of the degree of freedom that a local government 
council exercises on these issues: taking local strategic decisions without veto by 
higher level governments; formulating its own economic plans and development; 
determining its own operating budget/estimates; taking capital - project decisions 
(such as bank loans for developmental purposes). If LGCs can do these without 
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major modifications from States or Federal Government, then, autonomy and an 
atmosphere conducive for development at the grassroots would be said to exist.
One landmark contribution to theory building and operationalisation of the con-
cept of local government autonomy in Nigeria accrues to Odoh (2004, 44) who avers 
that “theoretically, autonomy is conceived as a derivative of decentralization and 
intergovernmental relations. Indeed, it is co-terminus with power, especially power 
as a resource base, and power as the relationship between governments.” Deduced 
from this, the author identified three key areas of power or autonomy, namely: 
democracy; legal/administrative competence; and finance. Autonomy reinforces the 
capacity and viability of local governments based on these three factors, and gives 
vigour to the earlier views expressed by Nwachuku (2000) on this issue.
It is further contended that the concept of autonomy becomes realistic based on 
the following characteristics of devolution: local government must be an organised 
entity with corporate powers; display governmental character with its principal offi-
cers elected or appointed by the local people, who they are in turn accountable to; 
enjoy substantial autonomy over its administrative, budgetary, revenue and fiscal 
matters. The inevitability of a law recognising the corporate existence and character 
as a government and identifying the functional areas and powers of local government 
in discharging those functions cannot be overemphasised. Predicated on these, Odoh 
(2004, 45) extrapolates that local government autonomy is pivoted on two issues: (1) 
“the resources available to local government (as the basis for autonomy)”; and (2) 
the control over these resources (legal or political or administrative) to harness and 
deploy these resources.”
The narrative however shows that a critical analysis of the performance of LGCs 
in Nigeria using the Autonomy test as a function of decentralisation; intergovern-
mental relations on key parameters of democracy, legal/administrative competence 
and finance has not produced the desired results. Not only has there been a continu-
ous whittling down of the powers of local governments in the aforementioned areas, 
studies show that there have been constitutional abuses/breaches; ambivalent and 
paradoxical constitutional provisions; conversion of LGCs to administrative outposts 
of the State Governments to mention but a few (See details in Onah, 2004a; Tonwe 
and Allen, 2009; Ibietan and Ndukwe, 2014a; Abe and Omotoso; 2014). Detailed 
discussion and incisive analyses on these and adjoining issues are reserved for sec-
tion 5 in this paper dealing with “Local Government Autonomy and Implications for 
Grassroots Development in Nigeria”. 
3.4 The Concept of Grassroots/Rural Development
Grassroots, rural areas and countryside refer to one thing. They are usually treated 
as synonyms which are used interchangeably and contrasted with urban areas. The 
definition of rural areas or grassroots is not in contest, they are basically typified by 
their features of infrastructural deficits; prevalence of poverty; peasantry; discon-
nect from urban areas due to poor feeder roads and many other factors. To remedy 
these rural conditions, Nnadozie (2002, 12) opines that the ultimate goal of rural 
development is to initiate projects and programmes that can “open up these … back-
ward and primitive areas and people of the country…”
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Mabogunje (1980) in Ibietan (2010, 32) offers a more elaborate definition of rural 
development thus:
Rural development is concerned with the improvement of the living rural 
standards of the low-income people living in the rural area on a self-sustain-
ing basis through transforming the socio-spatial structures of their produc-
tive activities. It implies a broad based reorganisation and mobilisation of the 
rural masses and resources; so as to enhance the capacity of the rural popu-
lace to cope effectively with the daily tasks of their lives and with the 
changes consequent upon this.
The implications of the above conceptualisation for grassroots development are 
three-fold: (1) Mobilisation and allocation of resources facilitate improvement in the 
living standard of the rural population. (2) The full participation of rural populace 
in the political and development process underscore allocative rationality and dis-
tributive efficiency at the grassroots. (3) There is the issue of making rural develop-
ment a sustainable process, and this calls for functional institutions across tiers of 
government; skills acquisition and expertise to optimise and manage available 
resources in the rural areas. To achieve these, national policies; administrative sys-
tems; and institutional capacities must be strengthened.
Oghoghoiye (2013, 257) building on Lele (1975) conceives rural development 
as “that which implies improving living standards of the mass of low-income 
population residing in Rural areas and making the process of their development 
self-sustaining.” It is particularly noteworthy that sustainability re-echoes in this 
definition, and this implies that rural development must be pursued as series of 
work in progress, owned and driven by the local populace with their own resourc-
es. The author further affirms that rural development comprises indicators such as 
food and nutrition levels; health; education; housing; security and recreational 
facilities. Self-help as an issue in rural development underpins these indicators. 
Self-help refers to “strategies that induce progress in rural societies, all of which 
do not involve action by governments” (Okoli and Onah; 2002, 172). Self-help is 
democratic, emphasises bottom-top approach to planning and execution of projects 
and programmes. It is inclusive and involves communal action through coordi-
nated efforts of the rural populace. Examples include the formation of agricultural 
cooperative movements and the execution of social infrastructural projects based 
on the “felt-needs” of the community. It engenders participation and a competitive 
spirit among and between communities, which ultimately relieves governments of 
the economic burden on social services provision (Ibietan, 2010). Local govern-
ments can leverage on this form of rural (self) mobilisation through appropriate 
coordination mechanisms to galvanise rural development. This becomes effective 
through the Integrated Rural Development (IRD) approach which emphasises inte-
gration, conceives rural development in its totality and as comprising multiple 
objectives. The application of the systems thinking to the IRD approach redresses 
problems of overlapping jurisdiction and intergovernmental jurisdictional squab-
bles/acrimony among tiers and levels of government; strengthens sectoral and 
organisational integration.
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4. Theoretical Framework: Local Government Development Theory
Local Government Studies present a galaxy of theories which illuminate our under-
standing on the workings of the local government system or the ideal practice at that 
level of governance. The theories include: Democratic-participatory; efficiency-
services; developmental; localist; public choice and dual state/politics thesis. Based 
on the focus of this paper, the development theory is considered applicable and use-
ful for the interrogation and analyses of the intricate relationship between local 
government autonomy and grassroots development in Nigeria.
The development theory of Local Government Studies has Sady (1962, in 
Ezeani; 2004) as its main proponent. Further contributions to the theory were made 
by Ola (1984, in Ezeani; 2012); Duru (2001b); and Ezeani (2004, 2012). According 
to Sady (1962), local government in developing countries should be concerned with 
the following:
1. Decongesting government at the centre, thereby freeing national leaders from 
onerous details and unnecessary involvement in local issues;
2. Increasing people’s understanding and economic development;
3. Making programmes to foster social and economic betterment at the local 
level more realistic and lasting;
4. Training people in the art of self-government; and 
5. Strengthening national unity (cited in Ezeani; 2004, 42)
Ezeani (2004) submits further that local government in developing countries can 
and should function to decongest the centre by implementing socio-economic pro-
grammes that reconstructs the required infrastructure for better living. Predicated 
on this and other tenets of development theory, local government is conceived as a 
veritable instrument for development, national integration, evolution and conscious-
ness (Ola in Ezeani; 2004:42), thus attempting to reduce the predominance of pov-
erty and underdevelopment in the Third World, including Nigeria (Duru, 2001b; 
Ezeani, 2012).
4.1 Application of Theory
Nigeria presents a practical but disturbing example of what federal practice should 
not be. The country parades a constitution which appears federal in name, but by a 
dubious and strange interplay of “soldiers and oil,” the practice assumes a unitary 
federalism which made the centre too bogus and powerful, thus confining fiscal 
relations to “feeding bottle federal practice” (Anichukwu; 2012). The dominance of 
the centre (federal government) in Nigeria has made sub-national governments less 
innovative, non-competitive economically and bereft of viability despite resource 
abundance (Suberu, 2004; Soludo, 2012). This Nigerian paradox has led to a con-
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comitant juxtaposition of affluence with affliction (Ibeanu, 2008). Through a whit-
tling - down of sub-national autonomy characterised by an increase in items on the 
Executive legislative list from forty-four in the 1960 constitution to sixty-eight items 
in the 1999 constitution (Onah and Ibietan; 2010, 264), centralisation has been rein-
forced and this has left other tiers of government prostrate and emasculated.
More specifically, the fiscal practice has been most unfair not only to the LGCs 
in Nigeria, it is equally pertinent to note that the provisions of Section 162 (5-8) in 
the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has been observed more in 
the breach, aggravates controversy in fiscal relations and a drag on the autonomy of 
local governments in Nigeria. Several studies corroborate this position (Onah, 
2004b; Ezeani, 2012; Ibietan and Ndukwe, 2014a; Abe and Omotoso, 2014). This 
contrasts sharply with the Brazilian practice in which the post transfer of revenue is 
less than 40% in favour of the federal government (Taiwo; 2000, 218; Ikeanyibe; 
2014, 565). Considerable political will and attitudinal re-orientation on the part of 
the governing elites are required to change this state of affairs if local governments 
must play their developmental roles and decongest the Centre in Nigeria.
LGCs must be financially responsible, innovative and competitive by leveraging 
maximally on their sources of internally generated revenue (guaranteed in the Fourth 
Schedule of the 1999 Constitution), and tapping into the benefits of Co-production 
for impact and development at the grassroots. Through co-production (Olowu; 
2002), local governments can collaborate with other agencies and public-spirited 
(grassroots) citizens to provide varying services that transforms rural conditions and 
galvanise rural development. Co-production encourages inter-dependence and sym-
biotic relationships between governments and a broad spectrum of stakeholders, and 
this enriches citizens’ understanding on programmes targeted at their advancement/
economic development as one of the tenets of the development theory.
Based on the above realisation, development initiatives and programmes are 
inclusive (collectively owned, driven and executed by the local populace) and sus-
tainable. Only devolved administration at the grassroots possess the character, attri-
butes and vitality to mobilise the people for the attainment of this goal. It is also 
plausible to argue that only devolution has the democratic imperative of utilising 
local government as a platform for training people in the art of local self-gover-
nance. This is an ideal based on the tenets of Local Government development theo-
ry, and Sharma et al. (2012) corroborates this in their characterisation of local gov-
ernment. However, the Nigerian situation vitiates this ideal, as several studies show 
reliance on impunity, democratic reversals, outright refusal by state governments to 
conduct democratic elections, and utilisation of Caretaker Committees at the third 
tier of government in Nigeria (for details, see Agi (2002); Onah (2004a); Wapmuk 
(2005); Tonwe and Allen (2009); Ezeani (2012); Ibietan and Ndukwe (2014b) and 
Ikeanyibe (2016).
There is a constitutional ambivalence in the above trajectory. The same Constitution 
that guaranteed the existence of democratically elected LGCs in Section 7 (1) created 
the unintended situation of tying them financially and in election matters to the umbil-
ical cord of states in Sections 162 (5-8) and 197 (1b), respectively. The implication of 
this is that state governors from the Second Republic (except for brief interregnums 
highlighted earlier) up till now; capitalised on these gaps and institutional weaknesses 
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to turn LGCs to personal fiefdoms. A reversal of this situation, backed by the develop-
ment imperatives of this theory will truly engender local self-governance.
The necessity for national unity in a plural and culturally disparate country like 
Nigeria cannot be overemphasised as a tenet of Local Government development 
theory. Local governments in Nigeria have been playing appreciable roles in this 
regard through institutional platforms/mechanisms such as: Association of Local 
Governments of Nigeria (ALGON) comprising chairmen of the 774 local govern-
ments in Nigeria, and Nigerian Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE) 
which is the umbrella body of Local Government workers in the federation. This 
should be sustained for maximum impact at the grassroots.
5. Local Government Autonomy and Implications for Grassroots 
Development in Nigeria
The basis for discussing this theme was laid in Section 3.3 of this paper. To reiterate, 
Odoh (2004) identified three key areas of autonomy as democracy; legal/administra-
tive competence; and finance. The extent to which these factors facilitate or hinder 
grassroots development in Nigeria shall constitute the focus of this section. 
Democracy is imperative for the effective functioning of a devolved self-gover-
nance at the grassroots. It underscores representative government, participation and 
accountability. This implies that where the local populace are involved in electing or 
selecting their leaders, representativeness, participation and accountability are satis-
fied as pivot for devolution and autonomy.
Democracy as a basis for autonomy has been operationalised by Odoh (2004, 
49-50) as comprising these:
a. Mode of selection of the political office holders in local government – by 
nomination or through election.
b. Mode of electing the Chief Executive of local government – by direct or 
secondary election.
c. Whether elections have been fair. 
d. Whether the State Governor interferes in the elections of these political office 
holders, especially the Chairman.
e. Whether local government executive and officials are consulted before major 
decisions are taken. For example, dissolution of councils, and creation of 
more local governments.
f. The extent to which local governments can involve communities in planning 
and budgeting. 
g. Accountability of the chairman – Is it ultimately to the electorate or to the 
state government?
To confirm the place of democracy as a basis for autonomy, the above (seven) 
parameters must skew heavily in favour of the local government and local populace 
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(electorate). The narrative and situation in Nigeria suggest that the above indices 
have been largely in default. Support for this assertion is found in the studies con-
ducted by Tonwe and Allen (2009); Ibietan and Ndukwe (2014a); and Ikeanyibe 
(2016). Detailed discussion on the different phases and features of local government, 
and how the localism principle underlines autonomy, plus grassroots development, 
are also contained in Ibietan (2008, 24-34).
Tonwe and Allen (2009, 359) submit as follows:
Elections were conducted twice into all the local government councils 
throughout the country; first on non-party basis on December 12, 1987 and 
then on party basis in December 1992. The position that the chairmen of local 
governments are the Chief Executives of their respective local governments 
was emphasised during this period and they along with their deputies were 
directly elected by the people. The executive arm of the local government 
was separated from the local council to effectively integrate the local govern-
ment system into the presidential system operating at the Macro levels.
The above state of affairs held during the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, who 
in an attempt to address the deteriorating autonomy of local governments, embarked 
upon bold and pro-active measures to wean LGCs from the overbearing influence of 
State Governors on local governments. Part of the measures taken witnessed the 
scrapping of State Ministries of Local Government; direct disbursement of statutory 
allocations from the Federation Account to LGCs; Ten percent of states’ internally 
generated revenue were to be given to LGCs in the respective states, and in cases of 
default, such amounts are deducted at source from the state’s share of federation allo-
cation on quarterly basis. It is noteworthy that this regime paraded a huge presence 
of Seasoned Academics at the Ministerial level and in the “Kitchen Cabinet”, and it 
is arguable that they must have brought theory to bear on the practice of governance.
It is observable that the above gains were reverted between 1993 and 1998 as the 
local government system witnessed a conversion to administrative outposts under the 
military regime of (late) General Abacha. At the re-emergence of civilian rule in 
1999, elections were only held between 2002 and 2004 at the local government level 
(Tonwe and Allen, 2009). Building on Asaju (2010), Ibietan and Ndukwe (2014a, 
760) report that, throughout the Second Republic (1979-1983), “no election was held 
into the Local Government Councils, only Sole Administrators were appointed.” The 
preceding presents a graphic and illuminating picture of how local government 
autonomy has been circumscribed in the country. How then can LGCs function as 
tools for grassroots development and decongest government at the Centre as a tenet 
of local government development theory?
More recently, Ikeanyibe (2016, 8) invigorated by previous studies presents 
these copious emblems of state governments’ infractions which have given rise to 
stultifying and emasculating local governments under their watch:
 • Abia State: in June, 2006, the governor dissolved the elected local govern-
ment officials. This matter had been in court since then, ending in the 
Supreme Court judgement of Friday, 11 July 2014;
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 • Rivers State: in 2012, the governor suspended 11 local council chairmen 
indefinitely for failing to attend a meeting called by the governor;
 • Delta State: the governor sacked the chairman of Burutu local government 
of Delta State, five months before the end of his first tenure in office;
 • Ondo State: in 2008, the governor of the state, on assumption of office 
sacked the local government chairmen and councilors;
 • Ekiti State: in October, 2010, 16 local government chairmen were sacked by 
the governor as a result of the court ruling of Justice Cornelius Akintayo of 
Ado Ekiti High Court that the State Independent Electoral Commission, 
which organized the election was not properly constituted;
 • Bayelsa State: in 2013, five local government chairmen were sacked from 
office by the connivance of the state governor and the state House of 
Assembly on the alleged crime of gross misconduct;
 • Imo State: the governor dissolved the Local Government Councils in 2011 
just to eliminate members of the People’s Democratic Party that has been in 
power in the state since 1999. The governor who was elected in May 2011 
was a member of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA);
 • Edo State: in late October 2012, the state House of Assembly connived with 
the governor to sack the 18 local government executives of council transition 
committees;
 • Anambra State: the state governor Mr Peter Obi refused to hold local 
 government elections while in office. The only local government election he 
held from 2006 to 2014 was the one held a few weeks before the end of his 
tenure in December 2013.
It is axiomatic from the above data and other analyses in this paper that constitu-
tional ambivalence reinforced by the complicity of the judicature in Nigeria con-
jointly relegate the autonomy of local governments to the realms of fiction and 
 theory. It is best imagined how development can take place in these circumstances.
Another key area of local government autonomy is legal/administrative compe-
tence. This emanates from constitutional and legal powers devolved to local govern-
ments as platforms for administrative actions or duties, and this underlines state-
local relations and jurisdictional latitudes. This factor stands at an intersection 
between democracy and finance as bulwark to autonomy. The legal basis of Nigerian 
local government which derives from the 1976 reform; and as enshrined in later 
constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is not in doubt. Section 7 and the 
Fourth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution underscore the democratic imperative, as 
well as the mandatory and concurrent functions of local governments in Nigeria. 
However, these are undermined by the nature of state interferences in purely local 
affairs, democratic reversals and ancillary anti-democratic practices highlighted 
(earlier) in this paper.
Other issues underscoring acrimony in state-local relations hinge on financial 
infidelity, political interference in administration/personnel recruitment, overlapping 
revenue generation jurisdiction. Additionally, due to the poor revenue base, LGCs 
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are confronted with poor leadership and techno-bureaucratic expertise, workers’ 
motivation and low morale, disconnect between local communities (in resource 
mobilisation and decision making) and the local government functionaries. These 
explain the poor capacity for service delivery and grassroots development ultimately, 
which also impinge on local government autonomy. Several studies, including Onah 
(2004a, 1-16); Ibietan (2010, 30-38); Wilson and Ibietan (2013, 135-142); Abe and 
Omotoso (2014:183-215) corroborate this position.
The constitutional ambivalence, breaches in federal practice and institutional 
weaknesses highlighted and bemoaned in this paper constitute serious puzzle and 
inhibition to the autonomy of local governments in Nigeria, and this hampers grass-
roots development in many ways. To resolve this puzzle, Onyeoziri in Onah and 
Ibietan (2010, 268) alluded to the inconsistencies that characterise the logic of fed-
eral practice especially in Nigeria, where each level/tier of government which is 
supposed to be coordinate and independent in its sphere become subordinated. This 
contradicts the letter and spirit of federalism in the Whearean conception. The argu-
ment stretches further that federalism creates certain liabilities for the integrity of the 
state which derives from the tension that characterises the inconsistencies in the 
logic of centralisation and decentralisation. In addition, the imperfections in state 
institutions also create disability for federal practice; therefore a meaningful discus-
sion of federalism must be backed with “the theory of state” (which is the infrastruc-
ture) onto which federalism is grafted. This closes the gap and a mutual reinforce-
ment of the two variables offers a reliable strategy for guaranteeing stable federal 
arrangements.
It is arguable that finance is the bedrock of local government autonomy. Odoh 
(2004, 51) expatiates that finance as the basis of autonomy comprises the following 
indices:
1. Amount of money available to local government from internal and external 
sources.
2. The regularity and reliability in disbursement of statutory allocation and how 
much of these end up in local governments account.
3. Internal revenue generation capacity and efforts of local government in 
 constitutionally designated areas like rates, fines, fees, property tax, invest-
ment and others as reflected and guaranteed in the 1976 Reform Guidelines; 
State edicts and Fourth Schedule of 1999 constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria.
4. Problems encountered by local government in raising revenue, especially in 
relation to administration, political and legal constraints.
5. Financial administration as typified by availability of revenues for project 
execution at the right time, plugging revenue losses through effective super-
vision of revenue collection, fraud prevention, stemming corruption by 
upholding transparency and accountability.
Studies have shown that the above indices operate within the ecology of Nigerian 
local government administration in the negative, and in many ways, circumscribe 
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the required autonomy for performance and grassroots development. For instance, 
Duru (2001b, 104-105) avers that rural poverty conspire with very high adminis-
trative costs of revenue to rob local governments of internal sources of raising 
funds. Oghoghoiye (2013, 262-268) corroborates this by affirming that rural pov-
erty is an inhibition to rural development in Nigeria. High incidence of corruption, 
fraud and embezzlement by LGCs revenue officials, inadequate staff/lack of 
experts to man finance and its allied units of audit, budgeting and planning have 
impacted badly on the expertise required for developmental purposes at the third 
tier of governance in Nigeria.
Onah (2004b, 192 & 196) alludes to “gross neglect of…financial obligations to 
local governments by state governments” and “denial of statutory allocation to local 
governments aggravates their low internal revenue generating capacity.” These con-
travene the constitutional provisions on public revenue as contained in Section 162 
(5-8). Adamolekun (2009, 19) submits that “… both state and federal governments, 
in different harmful ways, have undermined local government autonomy.” Adedeji 
in Ibietan and Ndukwe (2014b, 134) enumerates low quality staff, funding deficits 
among others as conjoining to “lead the local governments into a vicious circle of 
poverty … [and] circumscribing their powers/functions.” Local government autono-
my in the face of these can only belong to sophistry and rural development tanta-
mount to a mere ruse. On this note, Ikeanyibe (2016, 8) affirms that “the state gov-
ernors either misappropriate the funds of the local governments or reduce them to 
perform other functions meant for the state government.” The anatomy of the local 
government system in Nigeria as the foregoing discourse show is an emaciated and 
thoroughly emasculated institution which requires intensive care and attention to 
enable them to play their developmental roles robustly.
6. Conclusion and Recommendations
From the discussion and analyses of the themes and adjoining issues in this paper, 
it is observable that local government is a product of decentralisation. This must 
however be qualified to mean democratic decentralisation (devolution) which has 
autonomy as its corollary. The kernel of our argument in this paper is that only 
devolved systems of governance at the local level possess the attributes and capac-
ity for participation, resource mobilisation, and effective utilisation targeted at 
grassroots development. It is deductible from this and other studies that the above 
averments do not reflect the practice in Nigeria. It is also disturbing that the govern-
ing elites in Nigeria do not seem ready for the required reforms to position local 
governments as veritable agents of development. LGCs must rise to this challenge 
by being economically innovative, fiscally responsible, and be leadership/techno-
bureaucratic - competent. Power must be earned and taken to execute people-orient-
ed programmes geared towards rural development.
Predicated on the foregoing discourse, the paper recommends the following:
1. Sections 8 and 162 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria require another serious look and amendment to tinker with the super-
intending roles and untenable paternalism of state governments in state-local 
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relations (especially in fiscal practice), with a view to enhancing local 
 government autonomy.
2. The theory - to - practice approach of this paper is quite illuminating, and 
grassroots development will find expression in the tenets of Local Government 
(Studies) development theory and constitute realistic pivot for the reforms 
desired.  
3. LGCs should explore innovative and robust revenue streams by invigorating 
their extractive functions to boost internally generated revenue.
4. The paper highlighted the imperative of Co-production in service delivery. 
This is achievable through financial buoyancy and networked partnership 
with stakeholders in the development process.
5. As a corollary of the above, effective sensitisation and mobilisation of the 
rural populace is required for grassroots development as canvassed by the 
developmental school of thought.
6. There is need to energise agencies responsible for mobilisation, civic 
 re-orientation and elections (NOA, INEC), and institutions of allied man-
dates to improve and sustain citizen awareness; ensure credible/transparent 
process that can produce accountable and responsible leaders.
7. This paper suggests a complete de-politicisation of the institutions (and 
mechanisms) saddled with ensuring rectitude and accountability in public 
governance, thus strengthening them and leading to deceleration in resource 
plunder, mismanagement and conversion of public resources to private gain.
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